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Introduction 
Arbitration is omnipresent.1 If you have a bank account, a credit 
card, or a cell phone, you have an arbitration agreement. American 
businesses have incorporated mandatory arbitration agreements into 
all types of contracts.2 And, as a general rule, courts will enforce these 
arbitration agreements like any other contractual agreement.3 
But this was not always the case. There was a time when the 
judiciary was hostile to arbitration and refused to enforce arbitration 
agreements.4 In 1925, Congress responded to this judicial hostility by 
enacting the United States Arbitration Act, now known as the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).5 Section 2 is the heart of the FAA.6 Section 
 
1. One court has likened arbitration to the invasive vine kudzu: “When 
introduced as a method to control soil erosion, kudzu was hailed as an 
asset to agriculture, but it has become a creeping monster. Arbitration 
was innocuous when limited to negotiated commercial contracts, but it 
developed sinister characteristics when it became ubiquitous.” Knepp v. 
Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1999). 
2. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through 
Arbitration, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 233, 257–59 (2008) (discussing the 
spread of arbitration to the point of touching on “nearly all civil 
disputes,” including disputes among securities firms, disputes between 
securities firms and their investors and employees, broad employment 
disputes, and consumer disputes).  
3. As discussed infra, arbitration agreements reflecting a transaction 
involving commerce are enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Moreover, many states have adopted similar 
state laws. See, e.g., Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, Tenn. Code 
Ann. §§ 29-5-302 to -320 (2011); Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act, 710 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-23 (2011); see also infra note 10 (discussing the 
frequency with which arbitration agreements are enforced). 
4. See, e.g., Headley v. Ætna Ins. Co., 80 So. 466, 467 (Ala. 1918) (a 
contractual agreement to “submit every matter of dispute between the 
parties, growing out of such contract, to arbitration . . . to the end of 
defeating the jurisdiction of courts as to the subject-matter, [is] 
universally held to be void, as against public policy”); Rison v. Moon, 22 
S.E. 165, 167 (Va. 1895) (“[E]ither party may withdraw from an 
agreement to arbitrate, made after a cause of action has arisen, and 
before the award has been rendered, and . . . such an agreement is no 
bar to suit at law or in equity, and no foundation for a decree of specific 
performance.”); see also infra Part I.A (discussing in more detail the 
judicial hostility toward arbitration). 
5. As discussed in Part I.A infra, the FAA was originally enacted as the 
United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). It was 
codified in 1947 and is commonly referred to as Federal Arbitration Act. 
Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). Both the House Report and the 
Senate Report accompanying the legislation identified judicial hostility 
as the impetus for the legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act 
93 
2 is comprised of two discrete parts, which together strike a careful 
balance between federal regulation of arbitration agreements specifi-
cally and state regulation of contracts generally. The first part of 
section 2—the enforcement clause—provides that arbitration provi-
sions in written agreements affecting interstate commerce are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable.”7 The second part of section 2—the 
savings clause—clarifies that arbitration agreements are still subject 
to “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”8 As reflected in both the House Report and the Senate 
Report, the purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements 
on the “same footing as other contracts” and thereby overcome judi-
cial hostility to arbitration.9 
The FAA proved to be a turning point for arbitration, as it 
overcame judicial hostility such that arbitration agreements are now 
routinely enforced.10 Consistent with the savings clause in section 2,  
(discussing the jurisdictional “jealousy” of the courts and the resulting 
refusal to enforce arbitration agreements). The Senate Report reflects 
the same sentiment. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2–3 (1924) (discussing 
resistance to enforcing arbitration agreements and the reasons for that 
resistance).  
6. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983) (referring to section 2 as the “primary substantive provision of 
the Act”). 
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). As discussed in Part I.A infra, the text of section 2 
of the FAA is the same today as it was when it was originally enacted. 
Compare United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), 
with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
9. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 
(1924) (noting one could reasonably conclude that state and federal 
courts’ “desire to retain, if not extend their jurisdiction had much to do 
with inspiring the fear that arbitration tribunals could not do justice 
between the parties”). For more details about the purpose of Congress 
in enacting the FAA, see infra Part I.A.  
10. See, e.g., Hagrpota for Trading & Distribution, Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer 
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 9779, 2010 WL 2594286, at *5, *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 
2010) (compelling arbitration and noting that arbitration clauses are 
“routinely enforced” even if one party claims to be unaware that he 
agreed to arbitration); Grimm v. First Nat. Bank of Pa., 578 F. Supp. 
2d 785, 795, 801 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (compelling arbitration and noting 
that arbitration clauses printed on the backs of contracts are “routinely 
enforced”). As one commentator has noted, “[t]oday, arbitration agree-
ments are enforced in a staggering array of contexts” including those 
involving employment, health care, consumer transactions, and 
discrimination. Michael Moffitt, Three Things to be Against (“Settlement” 
Not Included), 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1203, 1230–31 (2009). “Regardless 
of the scale of the dispute, courts today consistently stay litigation in 
favor of arbitration when an arbitration agreement even arguably 
encompasses the dispute.” Id. at 1231.  
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however, courts have struck down arbitration agreements that 
violated generally applicable state contract law.11 Thus, at first blush, 
section 2 of the FAA seems to be accomplishing Congress’s purpose. 
Judicial hostility has been quelled, and arbitration agreements occupy 
the same footing as other contracts. 
But upon closer review, it becomes evident that the United States 
Supreme Court has thwarted the equal footing policy established in 
the FAA and replaced it with a judicial policy favoring arbitration.12 
Almost thirty years ago, the Court announced that the FAA 
evidenced a policy favoring arbitration, despite the apparent conflict 
such a policy has with Congress’s stated intent to place arbitration 
agreements on the same footing as other contracts.13 Since first 
announcing this favoritism policy, the Court has often repeated the 
policy as a basis for its decisions, to the detriment of the stated 
congressional policy of equal footing.14  
 
11. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 
2003) (holding an arbitration provision unenforceable due to un-
conscionability and reversing the district court’s decision compelling 
arbitration); Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 
1985) (affirming district court’s decision that an arbitration clause was 
unenforceable under New York law due to insufficient consideration). 
Justice Thomas has argued that Congress intended to save only some 
contract defenses with the savings clause. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(asserting that because the text of the savings clause uses the word 
“revocation” and omits the words “invalidation” and “nonenforcement,” 
the savings clause should not be interpreted to include all generally 
applicable state contract laws). If adopted, this narrow interpretation of 
the savings clause would break new ground. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (“Like other contracts, 
however, [arbitration agreements] may be invalidated by ‘generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” 
(quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996))). 
For a detailed analysis of Justice Thomas’s theory, see David Horton, 
Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 13, 24–30 
(2011) (arguing that Justice Thomas’s interpretation is inconsistent with 
both the text and legislative history of the FAA).  
12. See infra Parts I.B, III (discussing the Court’s overstep in creating a 
policy of favoritism regarding arbitration agreements). 
13. Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (announcing for the first time that “[s]ection 2 [of the 
FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary”), with H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 
(1924) (“[A]rbitration agreement[s are] placed upon the same footing as 
other contracts.”). 
14. See infra Part I.B (discussing the shift towards judicial favoritism of 
arbitration agreements). 
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This policy of favoritism was the cornerstone of the Court’s 
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,15 which extended the 
preemptive effect of the FAA to apply to a generally applicable state 
contract doctrine, thereby striking a blow to the savings clause of 
section 2.16 In Concepcion, the issue was whether the FAA preempted 
the application of the state-law doctrine of unconscionability to class 
action waivers contained in contracts with arbitration agreements.17 
Although the Court acknowledged that it should “place arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,”18 the Court 
emphasized that the FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”19 After acknowledging these two conflicting principles, 
the Court concluded that the “overarching purpose of the FAA” was 
to “ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to 
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined [arbitration] proceedings.”20 
Applying an obstacle preemption analysis,21 the Court then held that 
the rule at issue in Concepcion stood as an obstacle to this purpose 
and was, therefore, preempted.22 The “overarching purpose” identified 
by the Court is premised on the judicially created policy favoring 
arbitration and places insufficient, if any, weight on the stated 
congressional policy of equal footing. Based on this flawed purpose, 
the Court expanded the preemptive effect of the FAA to include a 
generally applicable state-law doctrine that should have been 
protected by the savings clause of section 2.23 
Part I describes the environment of judicial hostility that existed 
when the FAA was enacted. This Part next summarizes the legislative 
history establishing that Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was 
 
15. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
16. As discussed in Part II, the Court held that when a class action waiver 
is contained in a contract with an arbitration agreement, the FAA 
preempts a state-law rule applying the doctrine of unconscionability to 
the class action waiver. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. As a result, an 
unconscionable class action waiver in a contract without an arbitration 
provision is unenforceable, but the same unconscionable class action 
waiver in a contract with an arbitration provision is enforceable.  
17. Id. at 1746, 1753. 
18. Id. at 1745. 
19. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added).  
21. Obstacle preemption exists when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also infra 
notes 144, 145, 147, and 161.  
22. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
23. See infra Parts II.C, III. 
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to eliminate this judicial hostility by mandating that arbitration 
agreements exist on the same footing as other contracts. Finally, this 
Part describes the Court’s progression from hostility to favoritism.  
Part II describes the conflict between the Court’s policy favoring 
arbitration and the application of the savings clause to protect 
generally applicable state law, focusing specifically on the uncon-
scionability doctrine at issue in Concepcion. This Part then recounts 
the Court’s resolution of the conflict in Concepcion in favor of 
arbitration.  
Part III presents a critique of Concepcion.24 This Part argues that 
the Court improperly preempted state law by relying on a flawed 
purpose focused on enforcing arbitration agreements in order to 
facilitate streamlined arbitration proceedings. This purpose is 
fundamentally flawed because it ignores the equal footing policy 
reflected in the text of the FAA and expressed in the legislative 
history of the FAA, places undue weight on the judicially created 
policy favoring arbitration, and incorporates a vision of arbitration 
that is not reflected in the FAA. By premising its preemption analysis 
on this flawed purpose, the Court justified its expansion of the 
preemptive effect of the FAA. The text and legislative history of the 
FAA reflect that its purpose was simply to overcome judicial hostility 
by ensuring that arbitration agreements are enforced on equal footing 
with other contracts. Had the Court premised its analysis on this 
purpose, it would not have expanded the preemptive effect of the 
FAA to include a generally applicable state contract doctrine.  
 
24. Concepcion has been derided by commentators and citizen watch groups 
alike as sounding the death knell for class actions, encouraging corporate 
abuses, and providing further evidence of the Court’s pro-business, anti-
consumer bias. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 Or. L. Rev. 703, 704 
(2012) (“Concepcion will provide companies with free rein to commit 
fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being 
sued.”); Harvey Rosenfield & Todd Foreman, Supreme Court 
Arbitration Ruling: Courts for the Wealthy and Wall Street, Consumer 
Watchdog (April 27, 2011), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ 
newsrelease/supreme-court-arbitration-ruling-courts-wealthy-and-wall-
street (declaring that the decision “effectively eliminates” class action 
rights and will open the floodgates to corporate abuses); David 
Schwartz, Do-It-Yourself Tort Reform: How the Supreme Court Quietly 
Killed the Class Action, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 16, 2011, 10:52 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-how-the-
supreme-court-quietly-killed-the-class-action (“Concepcion is the latest 
in a long line of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Federal 
Arbitration Act in a manner consistently hostile to consumer and 
employee protection laws.”). This Article, however, focuses on the 
broader issue of the Court’s preemption analysis and, more specifically, 
on the Court’s analysis of the purpose of the FAA.  
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I. Arbitration and the Judiciary: 
 From Hostility to Favoritism 
The relationship between arbitration and the judiciary has 
gradually evolved. A century ago, the judiciary was hostile to 
arbitration agreements.25 In 1925, Congress enacted the United States 
Arbitration Act, now known as the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
to counteract that hostility and ensure that arbitration agreements 
received the same treatment as any other contract.26 Almost sixty 
years later, however, the United States Supreme Court shifted the 
level playing field intended by the FAA and announced a federal 
policy in favor of arbitration.27 This announcement ushered in a new 
era for arbitration. Arbitration agreements were no longer mere equals 
among contracts; arbitration agreements became super contracts.28 
Since first announcing this federal policy favoring arbitration, the 
Court’s FAA decisions have repeatedly relied upon this policy in 
support of pro-arbitration decisions.29 
 
25. See infra Part I.A. 
26. See supra note 5. 
27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . .”); see also infra 
Part I.B (explaining the Supreme Court’s shift from hostility to 
favoritism regarding arbitration agreements). 
28. See Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-dispute 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 249, 250 (2006) (noting that 
courts have arguably turned arbitration agreements into “‘super enforcea-
ble’ contracts,” making them more enforceable than other contracts). 
29. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 
(2008) (refusing to allow contractual expansion of judicial review of 
arbitration awards beyond that outlined in the FAA because the 
relevant provisions “substantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration 
with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential 
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”); Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 447–49 (2006) (reiterating that the 
FAA “embodies the national policy favoring arbitration” and holding 
that a claim that a contract is illegal and thus void ab initio is an issue 
to be resolved by the arbitrator under the severability doctrine 
established in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
Though bound by the Court’s decisions, some lower courts have 
begun—or continued—to openly question whether the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence is well reasoned, particularly its pronouncement of a 
federal policy favoring arbitration. Perhaps the most blatant example is 
found in Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 
250 (W. Va. 2011), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. 
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). In Brown, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to enforce an arbitration 
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A. The FAA: A Remedy for Judicial Hostility  
The FAA was conceived as a remedy for judicial hostility toward 
arbitration agreements. This judicial hostility dated back to colonial 
times.30 It was prevalent in both state31 and federal courts—reaching 
even the United States Supreme Court: 
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the 
country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all 
those courts may afford him. . . . In a civil case he may submit 
his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to 
the decision of a single judge. . . . He cannot, however, bind 
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically 
enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all 
occasions, whenever the case may be presented.32 
If one party to the arbitration agreement decided it no longer wanted 
to arbitrate, courts refused to compel arbitration, allowing the 
objecting party to revoke its agreement. This rule, followed by most 
state and federal courts, was referred to as the “revocability 
 
provision requiring arbitration of personal injury and wrongful death 
claims against a nursing home because arbitrating such claims was 
contrary to public policy. Id. at 292. The state supreme court 
acknowledged that such a rule disfavored arbitration for a particular 
class of transactions but concluded that Congress never intended the 
FAA to apply to such claims. Id. at 291. In discussing the United States 
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, the state court took the 
Supreme Court to task, describing some of the Supreme Court’s FAA 
precedent as being based on “tendentious reasoning” and “created from 
whole cloth.” Id. at 278–79. Moreover, contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
declaration of a policy favoring arbitration, the state supreme court 
concluded “that the purpose and objective of section 2 of the FAA is for 
courts to treat arbitration agreements like any other contract” and that 
“[t]he Act does not favor or elevate arbitration agreements to a level of 
importance above all other contracts.” Id. at 280. The United States 
Supreme Court swiftly vacated and remanded the decision. Marmet 
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012) (per 
curiam) (simultaneously granting certiorari, vacating the decision, and 
remanding to the state supreme court for assessment of whether the 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable under any common law 
principles not specific to arbitration). 
30. Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: Twenty-
Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 Charleston L. Rev. 331, 333–34 
(2010) (discussing treatment of arbitration by British and early 
American courts).  
31. See supra note 4 (explaining the general hostility arbitration agreements 
faced in state courts). 
32. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).  
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doctrine.”33 Judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements was 
premised primarily on the theory that parties could not “oust” the 
jurisdiction of the courts.34 An alternative, but less common, premise 
asserted that courts could not guarantee fairness in arbitration and, 
therefore, needed to protect the rights of citizens by granting access 
to the courts.35  
By the early 1900s, however, the business community had begun 
to rely heavily on arbitration and had grown increasingly distressed 
that courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements.36 So the 
business community lobbied for change.37 In 1920, the New York 
legislature passed the New York Arbitration Act of 1920,38 which 
legislatively overruled the revocability doctrine. This state legislation 
ultimately provided the model for the United States Arbitration Act,39 
 
33. Katherine V.W. Stone & Richard A. Bales, Arbitration Law 
22 (2d ed. 2010). For a more historical review of the revocability 
doctrine and the general hostility towards arbitration at the time the 
FAA was enacted, see Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of 
Commercial Disputes, 15 Va. L. Rev. 238 (1929) (comparing the law of 
arbitration agreements under common law with statutes).  
34. See also Stone & Bales, supra note 33, at 22–23 (noting that the 
“oust the court of jurisdiction” premise was the primary rationale 
accepted by the courts for refusing to enforce arbitration agreements). 
35. Id. at 23. In Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065), Justice Story relied on this premise in refusing 
to compel arbitration and explained that he could not compel specific 
performance of an agreement “where it [was] doubtful whether it may 
not thereby become the instrument of injustice, or to deprive parties of 
rights which they are otherwise fairly entitled to have protected.”  
36. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? 101–14 (1983) 
(discussing the efforts of the business community to effect a change in 
the law of arbitration); Stone & Bales, supra note 33, at 26–30 
(excerpting Auerbach and discussing the events leading up to the 
adoption of the New York Arbitration Act of 1920). 
37. In his article discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Southland v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), Kenneth F. Dunham provides a discussion of 
this burgeoning lobby for change. Dunham, supra note 30, at 335–37. As 
Dunham notes, this movement met with success at the state level. Id.  
38. Act of April 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803–07 (current version at 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503 (Consol. 2011)). 
39. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925); Stone & 
Bales, supra note 33, at 30 (discussing the passage of the United States 
Arbitration Act and noting that it was based on the New York statute). 
Just as business organizations lobbied at the state level, they also 
lobbied at the federal level. For example, in the joint hearing on the 
United States Arbitration Act, the New York State Chamber of 
Commerce, the Importers and Exporters’ Association, the Merchants’ 
Association of New York, and seventy-three other business organizations 
sent a representative to the hearing to make a case in favor of the 
legislation. Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or 
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which was codified in 1947 and is now known as the Federal 
Arbitration Act.40  
Section 2 of the FAA is the “primary substantive provision.”41 
Section 2 is the same now as it was when Congress first enacted it in 
1925: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.42 
With this provision, Congress intended to ensure that arbitration 
agreements occupied “the same footing as other contracts.”43  
Although Congress did not enact a statement of purpose, the 
House Report is particularly instructive. The House Report identifies 
the purpose of the bill as being “to make valid and enforcible 
agreements for arbitration”44 and notes that the law is necessary in 
order for “such contracts [to] be enforced in the Federal courts.”45 The 
House Report further explains that “[a]rbitration agreements are 
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make 
the contracting party live up to his agreement. . . . [Thus,] an 
 
Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, 
Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories 
or with Foreign Nations: J. Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before 
the Subcomms. of the S. and H. Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 
5–9 (1924). A number of other business or business-related 
organizations, including the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and 
Commercial Law for the American Bar Association and the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, similarly appeared at the hearing to support 
the legislation. Id. at 10–11. 
40. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). 
41. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 
883, 883 (1925); Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 2, 61 Stat. 669, 670 
(1947). 
43. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, 
The Law and Practice of Arbitration 114–16 (2009) (citing 65 
Cong. Rec. 1,931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham)) (explaining that 
the legislative history of the FAA shows that it was not intended to 
create new substantive rights, but to allow for enforcement of “ordinary 
contractual rights”). 
44. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
45. Id. 
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arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where it belongs.”46 The House Report then explains that 
the “need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American 
law” and describes the judicial hostility against arbitration 
agreements.47 In describing the process for enforcing an arbitration 
agreement, the House Report notes twice that the procedure 
established by the statute allows for enforcement while still protecting 
the parties’ rights.48 Thus, the purpose of the FAA as reflected in the 
House Report was to quell judicial hostility by mandating that arbi-
tration agreements be enforced on the same footing as other contracts.49 
Despite the enactment of the FAA, the judiciary remained wary 
of arbitration. This wariness was evident a full twenty-nine years later 
in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan.50 In 
Wilko, the Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that 
would have required the arbitration of claims under the Securities Act 
 
46. Id. (emphasis added). 
47. Id. The House Report provides a succinct summary of the history of 
judicial hostility: 
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts 
for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific 
agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were 
thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for 
so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in 
the English common law and was adopted with it by the 
American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was 
too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative 
enactment, although they have frequently criticised the rule and 
recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results 
from it. The bill declares simply that such agreements for 
arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the 
Federal courts for their enforcement. 
Id. at 1–2.  
48. Id. at 2. 
49. Similarly, the Senate Report reflects that the purpose of the FAA was 
to ensure that arbitration agreements were enforced on the same terms 
as other contracts. The Senate Report advises that “[t]he purpose of the 
bill is clearly set forth in section 2” and provides the text of that 
provision, including the savings clause. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
Like the House Report, the Senate Report explains that arbitration 
agreements were not being enforced at the time as a result of judicial 
resistance to arbitration. Id. at 2–3.  
50. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989); see also 
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480 (“The Court’s characterization of 
the arbitration process in Wilko is pervaded by what Judge Jerome 
Frank called ‘the old judicial hostility to arbitration.’” (quoting 
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 
(2d Cir. 1942))). 
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of 1933.51 In refusing to enforce the agreement, the Court concluded 
that the right to select a judicial forum under the Securities Act of 
1933 was not waivable.52 The Court reasoned that allowing a buyer to 
waive a judicial forum required the buyer to give up an advantage 
granted to him under the statute at a time when he was at a 
disadvantage in terms of knowledge.53 As one commentator has noted, 
this decision “reflected the distrust of arbitration as a process that 
could afford a claimant the same relief as a court.”54 But this vestige 
of judicial hostility would eventually give way.55 
B. The FAA: From Judicial Hostility to Favoritism 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court’s opinions began to 
reflect a change in the Court’s attitude towards arbitration. Although 
the plain language and legislative history of the FAA indicated that 
arbitration agreements were to be treated like all other agreements,56 
the Court began a slow shift that ultimately led to a policy favoring 
arbitration over other agreements. This favoritism policy is at odds 
with the equality dictates of the FAA.57  
The Court’s shift toward favoritism began in 1967 with Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.58 In Prima Paint, 
the Court announced the separability doctrine, holding that an 
 
51. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434–36. 
52. Id. at 435.  
53. Id. at 435–37.  
54. Dunham, supra note 30, at 343; see also Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 
244 (suggesting that courts “invented reasons to distrust” arbitration 
because they viewed “arbitration as a competitor”).  
55. Indeed, almost forty years later, the Court expressly overruled Wilko in 
Rodriguez de Quijas, concluding that the case “rested on suspicion of 
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the 
substantive law to would-be complainants.” 490 U.S. at 481. 
56. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
57. Stephen Friedman presented this conflict nicely: “There cannot be both 
equality and favoritism. The current status of arbitration provisions is 
probably akin to that of the pigs in George Orwell’s Animal Farm—all 
contract provisions are equal, but some (like arbitration provisions) are 
more equal than others.” Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: 
Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2035, 2038 
(2011). 
58. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see 
also Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 250 (“The holding in Prima Paint 
was the first step in the federalization of the law of arbitration . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Dunham, supra note 30, at 342–44 (arguing that 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), discussed infra notes 72–
77 and accompanying text, represents a turning point in the Court’s 
cases and builds on the Court’s holding in Prima Paint). 
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arbitration provision within a contract is its own contract and must 
be separated from the overall contract for independent assessment.59 
Thus, even if the overall contract is void, the courts must enforce the 
arbitration contract embedded within it unless the arbitration 
contract itself was induced by fraud or other unlawful means.60 The 
Court reasoned that this outcome was dictated by the language of the 
FAA, which focuses on the “making of the agreement for arbitration” 
rather than the contract generally.61 Without much discussion, the 
Court also concluded that this outcome was consistent with the 
savings clause of section 2 and the goal of the FAA to make 
arbitration provisions equal to other contracts.62 The Court reasoned 
that the separated arbitration contract would be subject to state-law 
challenges, just like any other contract.63 Justice Black, joined by 
Justices Douglas and Stewart, dissented and harshly criticized the 
separability doctrine.64 Among other things, Justice Black took issue 
with the majority’s decision because, rather than placing arbitration 
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts,” the separabil-
ity doctrine elevated arbitration agreements above other contracts by 
excluding them from the traditional analysis used to determine 
whether a contract provision is separable or non-separable, instead 
granting arbitration provisions permanent separable status.65 Thus, 
Prima Paint’s separability doctrine reflects a small step towards 
treating arbitration agreements with favor rather than as equal to all 
other contracts.  
 
59. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402–04.  
60. Id. at 403–04.  
61. Id. (quoting United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 4, 43 Stat. 883, 
883 (1925)). 
62. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 n.12. 
63. Id. at 403–04. 
64. Id. at 407–09 (Black, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 423–24 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). As one commentator has noted,  
it is difficult to imagine a set of facts that would give rise to a 
fraud or duress claim that centered specifically on the 
arbitration clause, rather than the container contract. After all, 
if a drafter had the desire and opportunity to exploit the other 
party, she would likely manipulate major terms such as price 
and quantity, rather than those that govern dispute resolution. 
Thus, by insulating the arbitration clause within the container 
contract, the separability doctrine shields the clause from several 
major contract defenses. 
David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 450 
(2011) (footnote omitted). 
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Twenty years later, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., the Court confirmed the “federal policy 
favoring arbitration” hinted at in Prima Paint.66 In Moses H. Cone, 
the district court stayed a federal action seeking an order compelling 
arbitration so that the parties could resolve a related state-court 
action. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by 
staying the case.67 As part of its analysis, the Court noted that the 
FAA would govern the case and declared that section 2 of the FAA 
reflected a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”68 The Court did not cite to the 
legislative history or acknowledge the conflict between this new 
favoritism policy and the equal footing policy reflected in the legislative 
history of the FAA and the Court’s own precedent.69 Noting that since 
Prima Paint the lower courts had “consistently concluded that 
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration,”70 the Court agreed with this 
conclusion and explained that “any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”71 From this 
point forward, the policy favoring arbitration would become firmly 
embedded in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. 
Less than a year later, the Court reaffirmed the policy favoring 
arbitration in Southland Corp. v. Keating.72 In Southland, the Court 
began its analysis of the FAA with a statement of the “national policy 
favoring arbitration.” 73 The Court then held that the FAA was more 
than a procedural statute governing federal courts and, instead, was a 
substantive statute intended to make arbitration agreements 
 
66. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
67. Id. at 19. 
68. Id. at 24 (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding 
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”). 
69. Id. at 23–25; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–
11 (1974) (“The United States Arbitration Act, . . . reversing centuries 
of judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements, was designed to . . . 
place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts . . . .’” (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 
(1924))).  
70. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. 
71. Id. at 24–25. 
72. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
73. Id. at 10. As in Moses H. Cone, the policy was asserted but was not 
supported by reference to the legislative history. 
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enforceable in both state74 and federal court.75 Justice O’Connor called 
the majority’s decision an “exercise in judicial revisionism.”76 
Nevertheless, the majority’s decision still stands and marks a 
significant turning point in arbitration law.77 From this point forward, 
the judicially created federal policy favoring arbitration would control 
in all courts.  
Twenty-five years after Southland, the Court’s policy favoring 
arbitration played an important role in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. 
v. Mattel, Inc.78 In Hall Street, the Court held that parties could not 
contractually expand the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration 
award beyond those set forth in the FAA.79 At first blush, this result 
might seem odd. After all, arbitration is a “creature of contract,”80 
and section 2 of the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration 
contracts according to their terms, subject to the savings clause.81 
 
74. Southland, 465 U.S. at 14 (“To confine the scope of the Act to 
arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what 
we believe Congress intended . . . .”). 
75. Id. at 12–16.  
76. Id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
77. Dunham, supra note 30, at 345. According to Dunham, the Court’s 
extension of the FAA began with Southland when the Court “converted” 
an act defining federal procedures to an act declaring substantive law 
that would be applicable in both state and federal courts despite 
minimal, if any, indication in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to declare substantive law. Id. at 332, 345–47. However, 
another commentator has concluded that the Court’s analysis of 
legislative history and congressional intent in Southland was correct. See 
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the 
Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 101, 105–07 (2002) (arguing that the legislative history has 
ambiguities and that permitting the FAA to apply in state court is the 
best interpretation of the legislative history).  
78. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
79. Id. at 590–92. 
80. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1960) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[S]ince arbitration is a creature of contract, 
a court must always inquire . . . whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate the particular dispute.”); see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (“The FAA reflects the 
fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); Nolde 
Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 
U.S. 243, 250 (1977) (“[T]he arbitration duty is a creature of the 
collective-bargaining agreement . . . .”). 
81. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (noting that the principal purpose of the FAA 
is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms”); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1995) (“[T]he central purpose of the Federal 
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Yet, in Hall Street, the Court rejected the terms of the arbitration 
contract, concluding that the arbitration the parties thought they had 
agreed to was not, in fact, the arbitration they were entitled to under 
the FAA.82 In reaching its decision that the text of the FAA 
precluded the parties from agreeing to additional grounds for judicial 
review, the Court emphasized the national policy favoring arbitration: 
[I]t makes more sense to see the three [FAA] provisions [related 
to judicial review] . . . as substantiating a national policy 
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to 
maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes 
straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore 
legal and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal 
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-
consuming judicial review process” . . . .83 
Thus, although the FAA was created to enforce the terms of the 
contract, the Court applied the policy favoring arbitration to justify a 
decision invalidating those very terms. As noted in Justice Stevens’s 
dissent, the outcome in Hall Street “conflict[ed] with the primary 
purpose of the FAA” of eliminating judicial hostility and requiring 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement according to its terms.84 
Faced with this conflict between the congressional purpose of 
enforcing the contract as written, subject to contractual defenses, and 
the judicially created purpose of favoring arbitration,85 the Court 
opted for favoring arbitration.  
 
Arbitration Act [is] to ensure ‘that private agreements to arbitrate are 
enforced according to their terms.’” (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479)). 
82. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 586. 
83. Id. at 588 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 
Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
84. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice 
Stevens asserted, when the primary purpose of the FAA is considered, 
the judicial review provisions of the FAA are “best understood as a 
shield meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a sword with 
which to cut down parties’ ‘valid, irrevocable and enforceable’ 
agreements to arbitrate their disputes subject to judicial review for 
errors of law.” Id. at 595 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2006)). 
85. The Court’s analysis in Hall Street foreshadowed the overarching 
purpose later identified in Concepcion. In Hall Street, the Court 
reasoned that the FAA should be read to allow for only the judicial 
review needed for the “essential virtue of resolving disputes 
straightaway.” Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588. As discussed infra Part 
III.A.3, the overarching purpose adopted in Concepcion similarly 
attempts to define the essential virtues or nature of arbitration. 
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As these cases reflect, more than eighty years after the enactment 
of the FAA, the Court has overcome its own hostility to arbitration 
and adopted a policy favoring arbitration.  
II. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
With the Court’s policy favoring arbitration firmly in place, the 
conflict between this policy and the savings clause of section 2 was 
unavoidable. The savings clause of section 2 promotes the 
congressional purpose behind the FAA—quelling judicial hostility to 
arbitration by placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with 
other contracts86—because the savings clause ensures that, like other 
contracts, arbitration agreements are subject to all generally 
applicable contract defenses.87 If arbitration agreements are favored to 
the point that federal law seeks to promote arbitration, then generally 
applicable state laws are bound to conflict with this favoritism policy. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion squarely presented this conflict. 
A. The Conflict: The Policy Favoring Arbitration Versus the 
Unconscionability Doctrine and the Discover Bank Rule  
California, like many states, has adopted the general contract 
doctrine of unconscionability.88 In short, if a contract is 
unconscionable, a court may refuse to enforce it. In California, 
unconscionability has both procedural and substantive components.89 
Procedural unconscionability looks to the circumstances in which the 
contract was made and focuses on “‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to 
unequal bargaining power,” while substantive unconscionability looks 
 
86. See supra Part I.A and infra Part III. 
87. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration 
provisions in written agreements “evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce [are] . . . valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” subject to a 
savings clause that provides for the application of “such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. 
88. Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2011) (“If the court as a matter of 
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
the contract . . . .”); see generally Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 208 (1981) (discussing the doctrine of unconscionability); 
Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint 
and Consistency, 46 Hastings L.J. 459 (1995) (discussing California’s 
unconscionability doctrine in detail). 
89. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 (Ct. App. 
1982) (noting that the California statute does not define 
unconscionability and explaining that the California doctrine has both 
procedural and substantive components); see generally 8 Richard A. 
Lord, Williston on Contracts § 18.10 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing 
the various state-law views). 
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to the terms of the contract and focuses on “‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-
sided’ results.”90 Although both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability are required under California law, California courts 
apply a “sliding scale” such that a strong showing of substantive 
unconscionability will overcome a weak showing of procedural 
unconscionability and vice versa.91 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
unconscionability doctrine falls within the savings clause of section 
2.92 Thus, it is no surprise that litigants have asserted the 
 
90. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 
(Cal. 2000) (quoting A & M Produce Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121–22) 
(summarizing the doctrine of unconscionability under California law and 
noting that it is applicable to arbitration agreements as a generally 
applicable contract defense); see generally Lord, supra note 89, § 18.10 
(discussing procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
91. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690; see generally John A. Spanogle, Jr., 
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931, 950 
(1969) (discussing the “sliding scale” of procedural and substantive 
elements of unconscionability). 
92. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(recognizing unconscionability as a generally applicable contract defense, 
along with fraud and duress). In Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme Court 
addressed the relationship between unconscionability and the savings 
clause. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). Although the 
Supreme Court declined to address the respondent’s claim in Perry that 
a particular arbitration agreement was unconscionable, the Supreme 
Court noted that the claim could be addressed on remand. Id. Perhaps 
anticipating the proceedings that would follow, the Court provided the 
following guidance:  
In instances such as these, the text of § 2 provides the touchstone 
for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of 
federal common law envisioned by the passage of that statute: 
An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
as a matter of federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Thus state 
law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that 
law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, 
and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle 
that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to 
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of 
§ 2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a 
manner different from that in which it otherwise construes 
nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely 
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a 
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for 
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the 
state legislature cannot.  
Id. (citations omitted). As discussed in more detail in Parts II.C and III 
infra, the Court in Concepcion also acknowledged that unconscionabil-
ity is one of the “generally applicable contract defenses” contemplated 
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unconscionability doctrine as a defense to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.93 Nor is it a surprise that courts have 
invalidated arbitration agreements on grounds of unconscionability.94 
 
by the savings clause. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687). Despite 
this acknowledgement, the Court went on to preempt a state rule applying 
the unconscionability doctrine to class action waivers. Id. at 1753.  
93. One commentator has asserted that unconscionability has become the 
“defense of choice” against arbitration agreements. Ramona L. Lampley, 
Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism 
of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the 
Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 477, 489–
90 (2009) (“Unconscionability, a general state law defense to contracts, 
became the defense of choice in early cases contesting arbitration clauses 
in employment or consumer agreements.”). There is some statistical 
support for this proposition, or at least for the proposition that those 
seeking to avoid arbitration have identified unconscionability as a viable 
theory. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and 
the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 185, 195 (2004) 
(concluding that over a two-year period 68.5 percent of 235 
unconscionability cases involved arbitration agreements). Then again, 
perhaps this arguably high number of unconscionability claims has 
something to do with the “aggressively drafted arbitration clauses” 
generated by employers and others “taking full advantage of the pro-
arbitration philosophy articulated by the federal judiciary.” Gavin, 
supra note 28, at 270–71 (asserting that drafters are “stamped[ing]” 
toward arbitration with very favorable provisions given the pro-
arbitration climate generated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the FAA (quoting William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment 
Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want 
To?, 43 Drake L. Rev. 255, 255 (1994))); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration 
Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 757, 766, 799 (2004) 
(describing an “upsurge” in the judicial acceptance of unconscionability 
as a means of dealing with arbitration agreements and suggesting that it 
“appears to be activated in part by the excesses of opportunistic legal 
actors attempting to capitalize on problematic legal doctrine” 
established in the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration cases). 
94. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1293 (9th Cir. 
2006) (holding that a franchise agreement’s arbitration provision was 
unenforceable as unconscionable under California law); Ingle v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the arbitration agreement in an employment contract was unconscionable 
and unenforceable under California law); Tillman v. Commercial Credit 
Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (holding that the 
arbitration clauses in the plaintiffs’ loan agreements were 
unconscionable and unenforceable); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending 
Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that an arbitration 
agreement in a consumer loan transaction was unconscionable and 
unenforceable). In one study, just over 50 percent of the arbitration 
agreements asserted to be unconscionable were found to be 
unconscionable. Randall, supra note 93, at 194–95 (analyzing decisions 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act 
110 
California’s so-called Discover Bank Rule is an “application of a 
more general [unconscionability] principle.”95 In Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, the California Supreme Court addressed an issue of 
first impression for California when it was asked to apply the doctrine 
of unconscionability to a class action waiver in a consumer contract.96 
The plaintiff asserted that the contract was procedurally unconscionable 
because it was an adhesion contract97 and substantively unconscionable 
because the class action waiver was an exculpatory provision.98 More 
specifically, the plaintiff argued that the class action waiver violated a 
 
over a two-year period). Some commentators have suggested that 
contracting parties and courts are turning to unconscionability in 
greater numbers in response to the Supreme Court’s increasingly pro-
arbitration decisions. See, e.g., Gavin, supra note 28, at 270–71 
(asserting that the Supreme Court may be generating a “backlash” such 
that contracting parties and courts are turning to unconscionability as 
“one of the few options left for denying enforceability of these 
agreements”); Stempel, supra note 93, at 765–66 (“[T]he legal system has 
witnessed an incremental effort by lower courts to soften the rough edges of 
the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence through rediscovery of . . 
. the ‘unconscionability norm’ . . . .”). 
95. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Gentry 
v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 
857 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Essentially, the Discover Bank test applies the 
general sliding-scale approach to unconscionability in the specific 
context of class action waivers.”); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless 
Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The rule announced in 
Discover Bank is simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis 
applicable to contracts generally in California . . . .”); Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005) (noting that 
unconscionability of class action waivers is a principle of California law 
that applies to contracts generally).  
96. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100. The specific provision at issue in 
Discover Bank was contained within a contract with an arbitration 
agreement. Id. at 1103. For purposes of the court’s unconscionability 
analysis, however, that fact was not important. Id. at 1108–10. In fact, 
the California Supreme Court did not invalidate the arbitration agree-
ment in the contract. Rather, the California Supreme Court invalidated 
only the class action waiver, thus leaving Discover Bank with the choice 
of whether it wanted the class action to go forward in arbitration, per 
the arbitration agreement, or in litigation. Id. at 1117.  
The California Supreme Court considered and rejected Discover 
Bank’s argument that the FAA preempted the application of uncon-
scionability to a class action waiver contained in a contract with an 
arbitration agreement. Id. at 1110–17. Of course, that argument 
ultimately proved victorious in Concepcion, as discussed infra.  
97. Respondent’s Opening Brief on the Merits at 12–13, Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (No. S113725), 2003 WL 
21397693, at *12–13 [hereinafter Opening Brief]. 
98. Opening Brief, supra note 97, at 13–18. 
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generally applicable California statute providing that any contract 
which serves “to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud 
. . . or violation of law . . . [is] against the policy of the law.”99  
While acknowledging that class action waivers were not excul-
patory clauses “in the abstract,”100 the California Supreme Court went 
on to recognize that when the damages are small, such waivers tend 
to eliminate the “only effective way to halt and redress” wrongful 
conduct.101 Moreover, although the class waivers purport to be 
bilateral, it is difficult to imagine that they actually impose any 
burden on the drafter in the consumer context.102 Thus, focusing on 
the classic characteristics of substantively unconscionable contracts,103 
the California Supreme Court concluded that “such one-sided, 
exculpatory contracts in a contract of adhesion, at least to the extent 
they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be 
imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable.”104 
The California Supreme Court stated that not all class action 
waivers were unconscionable.105 Rather, the California Supreme Court 
 
99. Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 (West 2011). 
100. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108. 
101. Id. at 1108–09 (quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 38 (Cal. 
2000)). 
102. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109 (“Although styled as a mutual 
prohibition on representative or class actions, it is difficult to envision 
the circumstances under which the provision might negatively impact 
Discover [Bank], because credit card companies typically do not sue 
their customers in class action lawsuits.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
103. Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(“Substantive unconscionability is indicated by contract terms so one-
sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (quoting Cal. Grocers Ass’n. v. Bank 
of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994))); A & M Produce 
Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122, 125–26 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(finding a disclaimer of warranties in a sales contract substantively 
unconscionable because the disclaimer unreasonably shifted risk from 
the knowledgeable seller to the inexperienced buyer and led to overly 
harsh and one-sided results); Baker v. Osborne Dev. Corp., 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 854, 858, 864 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding arbitration agreement 
in a home warranty booklet substantively unconscionable where it 
included a disclaimer of all warranties by the builder, significantly 
limited the remedies available to the buyer, and lacked mutuality when 
builder would have no reason to take legal action against the 
homeowners).  
104. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109.  
105. Id. at 1110. Although this comment might appear to be toothless, lower 
courts have taken the California Supreme Court at its word and rejected 
claims of unconscionability with respect to class action waivers. See, 
e.g., Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Diamond Foods, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 
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provided future courts with guidance on when class action waivers 
would be exculpatory and thus unconscionable under California state 
law. Specifically, a class action waiver is an unconscionable 
exculpatory provision under California law when: (1) the waiver is 
contained in a consumer adhesion contract;106 (2) the waiver is found 
in a setting that will likely involve disputes over small amounts of 
money; and (3) the plaintiff alleges a scheme to defraud many people 
out of small amounts of money.107 Thus, the Discover Bank Rule was 
born.  
In establishing the Discover Bank Rule, the California Supreme 
Court explicitly stated that the rule was applicable to all contracts, 
even though the particular contract at issue in Discover Bank 
included an arbitration provision.108 And, in the relatively short time 
 
3d 449, 461 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying the Discover Bank Rule and 
holding that the class action waiver was not unconscionable because, 
among other things, plaintiffs had other means of redress besides a class 
action given that the individual damages were large enough to warrant 
individual action); Arguelles–Romero v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 289, 305–07 (Ct. App. 2010) (same); see also Provencher v. Dell, 
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting assertion 
that if Texas law would permit enforcement of a class action waiver 
then it would violate a fundamental policy of California law relying, in 
part, on Discover Bank’s explicit statement that not all class action 
waivers are unconscionable). 
106. This aspect satisfies the procedural component of unconscionability. See 
Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 355-56 (Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability is 
established by the existence of a contract of adhesion). 
107. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. The second and third prongs of the 
Discover Bank Rule work together to establish substantive 
unconscionability. The alleged wrong is one that is unlikely to be 
vindicated absent the class action mechanism, thus making the class 
action waiver exculpatory. See Monica T. Nelson, Comment, Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court: The Unconscionability of Classwide Arbitration 
Waivers in California, 30 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 649, 659–71 (2007) 
(analyzing Discover Bank’s holding of substantive unconscionability in 
class action waivers and its application to later California cases); 
Jonathan Rizzardi, Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1093, 1095–96 (2006) (discussing the 
public policy rationales and substantive unconscionability factors at play 
in Discover Bank). 
108. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1112. In Discover Bank, the California 
Court of Appeals had concluded that while the unconscionability 
doctrine could invalidate a class action waiver in most contracts, it 
could not do so when the class waiver was contained in an arbitration 
agreement governed by the FAA. Id. at 1111–12. The California 
Supreme Court rejected that conclusion, calling it “puzzling” because it 
ignored the fact that the doctrine being applied was a generally 
applicable contract doctrine. Id. Lest there be any doubt, the California 
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since Discover Bank was decided, the Discover Bank Rule has been 
applied to class action waivers contained in contracts without 
arbitration agreements.109 Thus, the Discover Bank Rule would appear 
to be a generally applicable state-law doctrine well within the savings 
clause of section 2. 
B. The Conflict Continues:  
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion in the Lower Courts 
Almost a year after the California Supreme Court announced the 
Discover Bank Rule, the plaintiffs in Concepcion filed a putative class 
action complaint against AT&T Mobility LLC (“AT&T”) in the 
Southern District of California.110 The plaintiffs alleged that AT&T 
engaged in a fraudulent marketing scheme whereby it “bait[ed]” 
customers with promises of free or discounted phones only to charge 
them sales tax on the full value of the phones.111 The named plaintiffs’ 
total damages? $30.22.112 
 
Supreme Court clarified the general applicability of the principle it was 
announcing:  
[T]he principle that class action waivers are, under certain 
circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully exculpatory is a 
principle of California law that does not specifically apply to 
arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally. In other 
words, it applies equally to class action litigation waivers in 
contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class 
arbitration waivers in contracts with such agreements. 
Id. at 1112.  
109. See, e.g., In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 F.R.D. 459, 465–67 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(applying the Discover Bank Rule to class action waivers in advertising 
agreements without arbitration provisions).  
110. The decision in Discover Bank was issued on June 27, 2005. Discover 
Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100. The plaintiffs in Concepcion filed a putative 
class action complaint against Cingular Wireless, now known as AT&T 
Mobility LLC, on March 27, 2006. Complaint for Violations of 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act; Unfair Competition Law; False 
Advertising Statute; Fraudulent Concealment; and Unjust Enrichment, 
Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06CV0675 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
27, 2006), 2006 WL 1194855 [hereinafter Concepcion Complaint].  
111. Concepcion Complaint, supra note 110, ¶ 11; see also Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to 
Compel Individual Arbitration by Defendant, Laster v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 
(9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 2008 WL 2073403 [hereinafter Concepcion 
Opposition to Arbitration] (discussing AT&T’s alleged misconduct); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
112. Concepcion Complaint, supra note 110, ¶ 8; First Amended Complaint 
for Violations of Consumers Legal Remedies Act; Unfair Competition 
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In March 2008, two years after the Concepcion complaint was 
filed, AT&T moved to compel arbitration.113 Moreover, AT&T sought 
 
Law; False Advertising Statute; Fraudulent Concealment; and Unjust 
Enrichment ¶ 4, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06CV0675 
(S.D. Cal. May 2, 2006), 2006 WL 1866797; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1744. 
113. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. The case has an interesting, if 
convoluted, procedural history. Before the Concepcion Complaint was 
filed, at least three other named plaintiffs filed suits in state court 
against AT&T (then Cingular Wireless) and other cellular companies 
alleging facts similar to those alleged in the Concepcion Complaint. See 
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (discussing procedural 
history of the case up to the point of the district court’s denial of the 
motion to compel arbitration), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT & T 
Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). These plaintiffs’ 
claims were removed to the Southern District of California. Id. at *4. 
One was dismissed without prejudice, but the other two remained in 
what is referred to as the Laster case. Id. AT&T and T-Mobile filed 
motions to compel arbitration, but the court denied the motions and 
rejected the defendants’ preemption arguments. Id. Defendants 
appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Concepcion case was 
consolidated with the Laster case. Id. On August 17, 2007, while the 
appeal was still pending, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued 
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 
2007), holding that AT&T’s class action waiver was unconscionable 
under California law and that the FAA did not preempt such a holding. 
Id. at 978. As a result, AT&T dismissed its appeal in the Laster case. 
T-Mobile did not dismiss its appeal, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court on October 25, 2007, in an unpublished memorandum. 
Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *5. T-Mobile sought review by the United 
States Supreme Court on January 25, 2008. Id. AT&T’s attempt to 
compel arbitration in the Concepcion matter was filed on March 13, 
2008, while T-Mobile’s petition for certiorari was still pending. Id. The 
United States Supreme Court denied T-Mobile’s petition on May 27, 
2008. Id. Just two years later, the Supreme Court granted AT&T’s 
petition. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2012) 
(granting cert. on May 24, 2010).  
According to AT&T, the class waiver at issue in the Concepcion case 
was distinct from the waivers previously rejected by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *5. More specifically, 
during the pendency of the Concepcion matter, AT&T amended the 
contract and asserted that the amended provision controlled. Id. at *6. 
The district court agreed. Id.  
One can only speculate about what made the difference between T-
Mobile’s petition in Laster and AT&T’s petition two years later in 
Concepcion. One commentator has speculated that if the Supreme Court 
wanted the outcome reached in Concepcion, the Concepcion facts 
provided a perfect vehicle for accomplishing it as the arbitration 
provision at issue could be considered, at least relatively speaking, 
consumer friendly. See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on 
Unconscionability, PrawfsBlawg (May 5, 2011, 9:40 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg /2011/05/atts-long-game-on-
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individual arbitration, rather than class-wide arbitration, pointing to 
the class action waiver contained in the plaintiffs’ contract.114 The 
plaintiffs objected, asserting that the class action waiver was 
unenforceable because it was unconscionable under California law.115 
AT&T disputed the assertion that the provision was unenforceable 
and asserted that the unconscionability doctrine was preempted by 
the FAA when applied to class action waivers contained in contracts 
with arbitration agreements.116 
On August 11, 2008, the district court denied AT&T’s motion to 
compel arbitration.117 After reviewing the general principles of 
unconscionability and the application of those principles to class 
waivers as set forth in Discover Bank, the district court concluded 
that the class waiver provision at issue was unconscionable and, 
therefore, unenforceable.118 The district court also rejected AT&T’s 
assertion that the FAA preempted such a holding.119 
 
unconscionability.html (noting that AT&T actually opposed certiorari in 
the Laster matter because its new arbitration provision was, in Bruhl’s 
words, “so amazingly consumer-friendly that if any court struck it down, 
such a ruling would have to be preempted because it would represent a 
per se bar against class waivers even when consumers could profitably 
pursue individual arbitration”); see also Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, 
All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the 
Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 
550–51 (2012) (agreeing with Bruhl that the Court may have been 
waiting for the “ideal vehicle through which [it] could advance its FAA 
agenda” and suggesting that the Supreme Court might not have 
accepted certiorari had Concepcion originated in state court given the 
previous statements of at least three Justices that Southland should be 
overruled such that the FAA would not apply in state court).  
114. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant AT&T 
Mobility LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss Claims of 
Concepcion Plaintiffs Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act at 2–3, 
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT & T 
Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 2008 WL 2073400 
[hereinafter AT&T’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel]. 
115. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; see also Concepcion Opposition to 
Arbitration, supra note 111, at 10 (arguing that the class action waiver 
was unconscionable under applicable state law). As discussed in the 
Plaintiff’s memorandum, California unconscionability law requires a 
finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Id. at 11.  
116. AT&T’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 114, 
at 18–20; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48. 
117. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *1. 
118. Id. at *6–14. 
119. Id. at *14 n.11 (adopting the reasoning set forth in a prior order denying 
the motion to compel other plaintiffs to arbitrate).  
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Although AT&T appealed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision that the class waiver at issue was 
unconscionable.120 Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
the general principles of unconscionability and the application of 
those principles to class waivers as described in Discover Bank.121 The 
Ninth Circuit then applied the three-prong Discover Bank Rule and 
held that the class waiver at issue was unconscionable.122 Nothing in 
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Discover Bank Rule to the class 
waiver at issue had anything to do with the fact that the class waiver 
existed in a contract with an arbitration agreement. The analysis 
would have been the same even if the class waiver had existed in an 
agreement that did not include an arbitration provision.123 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected AT&T’s assertion that the FAA 
preempted the application of the unconscionability doctrine to class 
action waivers contained in contracts with arbitration agreements.124 
First, the Ninth Circuit rebuffed AT&T’s contention that the 
Discover Bank Rule was a “‘new rule’ applicable only to arbitration 
agreements” and, thus, outside the scope of the savings clause and 
expressly preempted.125 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
the Discover Bank Rule is nothing more than an application of 
California’s unconscionability doctrine in the context of class action 
waivers.126 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Discover 
 
120. Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011). 
121. Laster, 584 F.3d at 853–54. 
122. Id. at 854–55. 
123. See id. at 854 (“We have interpreted Discover Bank as creating a three-part 
test to determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is 
unconscionable . . . .”). As the Ninth Circuit’s analysis reflects, in 
applying the three parts of the Discover Bank Rule, the forum in which 
the class action will take place—or not, if the waiver is successful—is 
irrelevant. The contract is adhesive (or not) regardless of whether it 
involves an arbitration agreement. The dispute involves predictably 
small claims (or not) regardless of whether the contract contains an 
arbitration agreement. And the allegations will involve a scheme to 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of small sums of money (or not) 
regardless of whether the contract contains an arbitration agreement.  
124. Id. at 856. 
125. Id. at 857. 
126. Id. As discussed earlier, California courts require both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, but the two components exist on a sliding 
scale such that more of one will allow less of the other. See supra Part 
II.A and accompanying notes. The Ninth Circuit placed the Discover 
Bank Rule in this context: “The best way to read Discover Bank in light 
of the sliding-scale approach is that, if a contract clause is, in practice, 
exculpatory, as long as there is any degree of procedural 
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Bank Rule does not expose arbitration clauses to different standards 
from those applicable to other contracts.127  
After resolving AT&T’s express preemption claim, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected AT&T’s implied preemption claim.128 Although the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a state law would be impliedly 
preempted if it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”129 the court 
rejected AT&T’s claim that California’s unconscionability doctrine 
interfered with Congress’s purposes in enacting the FAA.130 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that the 
FAA did not impliedly preempt California’s unconscionability law.131 
And so the stage was set. With both the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit concluding that AT&T’s class waiver was unconscionable 
and that the generally applicable doctrine of unconscionability as 
applied by the Discover Bank Rule was not preempted by the FAA, 
AT&T appealed the preemption issue to the United States Supreme 
Court seeking protection from California’s unconscionability doctrine.132 
And protection it would get.  
 
unconscionability, the element of substantive unconscionability is 
generally adequate, as a matter of law.” Laster, 584 F.3d at 857. This 
tipping of the sliding scale to allow minimal procedural 
unconscionability to suffice in the face of significant substantive 
unconscionability is not unique to class action waivers. See, e.g., 
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1293 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(applying a sliding scale and concluding that arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable where substantive unconscionability was significant even 
though procedural unconscionability was minimal); Horton v. Cal. 
Credit Corp., No. 09-CV274-IEG-NLS, 2009 WL 2488031, at *4–7 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 13, 2009) (holding that an agreement forcing borrowers to 
take all claims to arbitration, while lender reserved right to judicial 
forum for foreclosure claims, and forcing borrowers to incur up-front 
costs in order access arbitration forum showed sufficient substantial 
unconscionability to overcome the minimal degree of procedural 
unconscionability present in the adhesion contract). 
127. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs. Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 
988 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
130. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857–58. Citing its previous analysis in Shroyer, 498 
F.3d at 989, the Ninth Circuit identified two purposes underlying the 
FAA: “first, to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration agreements by 
placing them on the same footing as any other contract, and second, to 
promote the efficient and expeditious resolution of claims.” Laster, 584 
F.3d at 857. 
131. Laster, 584 F.3d at 859. 
132. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–2, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 6617833, at 
*1–2. AT&T wisely reframed the issue to avoid acknowledging that the 
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C. Resolution: The Court’s Policy of Favoring Arbitration Compels the 
Preemption of the Discover Bank Rule 
Concepcion squarely presented the question of whether a 
generally applicable state contract doctrine could be preempted by 
the FAA, despite the explicit savings clause of section 2. In a five–
four decision, the United States Supreme Court answered that 
question in the affirmative and expanded the preemptive effect of the 
FAA.133  
Writing for the majority,134 Justice Scalia defined the issue in 
Concepcion as “whether the FAA prohibit[ed] States from conditioning 
the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability 
of classwide arbitration procedures.”135 After noting that the FAA 
responded to “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,” 
the Court identified two principles: (1) section 2 reflects a “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration,”136 and (2) “arbitration is a matter 
 
doctrine at issue was a generally applicable contract doctrine, instead 
framing the issue as follows: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempts States from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement on the availability of particular procedures—here, class-wide 
arbitration—when those procedures are not necessary to ensure that the 
parties to the arbitration agreement are able to vindicate their claims.” 
Id. at i. The majority adopted this reframing. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1744 (“We consider whether the FAA prohibits States from 
conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”). 
133. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
134. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 1743. Although Justice 
Thomas penned an alternative analysis, discussed supra note 11 and 
infra note 145, he joined in the majority opinion, stating that he 
believed the test outlined in the majority opinion would often lead to 
the same outcome as his own test and that having a majority opinion 
was important in providing lower courts with guidance. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring). One commentator has 
suggested that Justice Thomas’s concurrence so clearly rejects the 
reasoning of the majority opinion that it converts the majority opinion 
into a plurality opinion. See Lisa Tripp, Arbitration Agreements Used 
by Nursing Homes: An Empirical Study and Critique of AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 35 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 87, 113–23 (2011) (discussing 
the differences in the two opinions and arguing that “Justice Thomas 
reaches the same conclusion as the putative majority—that the Discover 
Bank rule is preempted by the FAA—but rejects every aspect of the 
putative majority’s opinion”). 
135. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
136. Id. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of contract.”137 The Court not only acknowledged that “courts must 
place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other 
contracts,” but also indicated that the equal footing requirement is in 
harmony with these two principles.138 
Turning to the savings clause of section 2, the Court recognized 
that the savings clause permits the invalidation of arbitration 
agreements by “‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as . . . 
unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration 
or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to 
arbitrate is at issue.”139 Implicitly acknowledging that the Discover 
Bank Rule did not fall within this category of preempted defenses, the 
Court identified a new category of potentially preempted defenses. 
Specifically, the Court concluded that a generally applicable contract 
defense, which would otherwise be preserved by the savings clause of 
section 2, could be preempted if it was “applied in a fashion that 
disfavors arbitration”140 or “disproportionate[ly] impact[s] arbitration 
agreements.”141  
 
137. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
138. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
139. Id. at 1746 (emphasis added) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
140. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. The Court cited Perry v. Thomas, 482 
U.S. 483 (1987), in support of this principle. In Perry, an employee 
asserted that an arbitration agreement in his employment contract was 
unconscionable because the arbitration selection process would result in 
biased arbitration and because arbitration would not provide for 
adequate discovery. Id. at 487 n.4. The Court declined to reach the 
unconscionability claim, as it had not been decided below. Id. at 492 
n.9. But the Court offered the lower courts some preemptive guidance, 
reminding the lower courts that any “state-law principle that takes its 
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue” 
would not be within the meaning of the savings clause. Id. Instead, a 
court must construe arbitration agreements in the same manner as non-
arbitration agreements and may not “rely on the uniqueness of an 
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable.” Id. Thus, the Court implied that 
a state court could not declare an arbitration agreement unconscionable 
based on the unique procedures of the arbitral forum because the 
unconscionability doctrine would then be a pretext for the true anti-
arbitration reason for the decision. Concepcion takes the Perry guidance 
a step further by focusing on a doctrine that does not draw any meaning 
from the fact that the contract includes an arbitration agreement, 
although the doctrine could affect the procedures under which the 
arbitration would proceed, just as it could affect the procedures under 
which litigation would proceed if the contract did not have an 
arbitration agreement.  
141. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. Notably, to the extent arbitration 
agreements are disproportionately affected by the Discover Bank Rule, 
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Although the Court acknowledged that Discover Bank “applied 
[the unconscionability] framework to class-action waivers,” the Court 
emphasized that the class action waiver at issue in Discover Bank was 
contained in a contract with an arbitration agreement.142 Indeed, the 
Court reframed California’s Discover Bank Rule to underscore its effect 
on arbitration agreements, describing it as “classifying most collective-
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”143  
Having announced that generally applicable doctrines having a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements could be 
preempted despite the savings clause and emphasizing the Discover 
Bank Rule’s effect on arbitration agreements, the Court conducted a 
preemption analysis and concluded that the Discover Bank Rule was 
indeed preempted by the FAA.144 Relying on obstacle preemption,145 
 
that effect is a function of the ubiquitous nature of arbitration 
agreements, particularly in consumer contracts, not the rule itself. Thus, 
contract drafters created the circumstances that the Court relied on, in 
part, to explain why the Discover Bank Rule is not preserved as a 
generally applicable state doctrine pursuant to the savings clause of 
section 2. 
142. Id. at 1746.  
143. Id. (emphasis added). At one point, the Court asserted that the 
Discover Bank Rule had been frequently applied to hold arbitration 
agreements unconscionable. Id. In each of the three cases cited by the 
Court in support of this statement, however, the California court found 
a class action waiver unconscionable, not an arbitration agreement. See 
Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 819–21, 823 (Ct. App. 
2006) (finding class action waiver unconscionable); Klussman v. Cross 
Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 739–40 (Ct. App. 2005) (same); 
Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237–38 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(same). In one of the cases cited by the Court, the motion to compel 
arbitration was denied because of an unconscionable class waiver and an 
unreasonable forum selection clause, which presumably could not be 
severed from the arbitration agreement. See Aral, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
238, 242 (finding it unreasonable to expect California consumers “to 
travel to Georgia to obtain redress on a case-by-case basis”). In the 
remaining two cases, the arbitration agreements containing the 
unconscionable class action waivers were invalidated because the 
agreements included non-severability clauses providing that the class 
action waiver could not be severed from the arbitration agreement. 
Cohen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 816; Klussman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 741. 
Thus, the arbitration agreement could have been enforced but for the 
defendant’s decision to tie the fate of the arbitration agreement to the 
fate of the class waiver. The arbitration agreement in Concepcion had a 
similar provision requiring that if the class waiver was “found to be 
unenforceable, then the entirety of this arbitration provision shall be 
null and void.” Brief for Respondents at 3, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292 at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
144. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Federal preemption of state law can 
result from either express preemption, where the federal statute’s 
language explicitly preempts state law, or implied preemption, where the 
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the Court held that the Discover Bank Rule stood “as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress” and, therefore, was preempted.146  
To reach this holding, the Court first concluded that the 
“overarching purpose of the FAA” is to “ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”147 To establish this purpose, the Court 
began with the uncontroversial policy of enforcing arbitration 
 
preemption is implicit in light of the “structure and purpose” of the 
federal statute. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 
98 (1992). The Supreme Court has recognized two types of implied 
preemption: (1) field preemption, where the federal law occupies the 
entire field and (2) conflict preemption, where it is impossible to comply 
with both state and federal law or “where the state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’” Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941)). This latter type of conflict preemption is referred to as 
obstacle preemption. See James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption 
of State and Local Law: Legislation, Regulation and 
Litigation 74–76 (2006) (providing a thorough discussion of the law of 
preemption, including obstacle preemption).  
145. The Supreme Court previously recognized that the FAA has no express 
preemptive provision and that Congress did not intend to occupy the 
entire field of arbitration when it adopted the FAA. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. 
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989). 
Thus, state law will only be preempted by the FAA under a conflict 
preemption analysis. Id. 
Although Justice Thomas joined the majority in Concepcion, he also 
penned a concurring opinion explaining that he would read section 2 of 
the FAA to limit the savings clause to doctrines related to defects in the 
making of an agreement. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). As such, the Discover Bank Rule would be preempted 
under an impossibility conflict analysis. Id. In doing so, Justice Thomas 
reaffirmed his skepticism of “purposes-and-objectives pre-emption” as 
stated in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754. In Wyeth, Justice Thomas 
noted that he had become “increasingly skeptical of this Court’s 
‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence” because its reliance 
on “perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative 
history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not 
embodied within the text of the federal law” makes it “inconsistent with 
the Constitution.” Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 583; see also infra note 161 
(providing a more detailed description of Justice Thomas’s and others’ 
criticisms of obstacle preemption). 
146. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941)).  
147. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. In determining whether state law is 
preempted, the question is “one of congressional intent” and the 
“ultimate touchstone” is Congress’s purpose in enacting the federal law. 
Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 
202, 208 (1985)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
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agreements according to their terms. The Court then turned to the 
policy favoring arbitration, which the Court has found in the FAA. 
Building on that policy,148 the Court concluded that the FAA not 
only reflects a policy favoring arbitration but “was designed to 
promote arbitration.”149 Moreover, the Court noted that one of the 
primary purposes of an arbitration agreement is to obtain 
“streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”150 Taken together, 
these principles provided the basis for the Court’s premise that the 
overarching purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements 
in order to “facilitate streamlined proceedings.”151  
With the overarching purpose identified, the Court turned to 
consideration of whether the Discover Bank Rule stood as an obstacle 
to that purpose. Given the focus of the overarching purpose on the 
facilitation of streamlined proceedings, the Court focused its analysis 
on whether class arbitration interfered with the promotion of such 
proceedings.152 The Court concluded that class arbitration would 
“make[ ] the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass.”153 The Court further concluded that class 
arbitration would require a level of “procedural formality” 
significantly different from the informality traditionally associated 
with arbitration.154 Finally, the Court concluded that the potential for 
class arbitration would deter defendants from choosing arbitration 
because it would significantly increase their risk given the high stakes 
of the case and the lack of appellate review for arbitral awards.155 
Based on these three distinctions, the Court determined that class 
arbitration was not the streamlined proceeding envisioned and favored 
 
148. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (relying on ‘‘a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive 
or procedural policies to the contrary” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
149. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (emphasis added). 
150. Id. (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
151. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. While the Court acknowledged the 
equal footing policy in its opinion, the Court’s analysis of the 
overarching purpose of the FAA neglects that policy. Id. at 1748–49. 
152. See id. at 1750–52 (describing class arbitration as slower and more 
costly than proceeding in court or individual arbitration). 
153. Id. at 1751.  
154. Id.  
155. See id. at 1752 (“[W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of 
potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an 
error will often become unacceptable.”).  
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by the FAA.156 Thus, the Court held that the Discover Bank Rule 
stood as an obstacle to the overarching purpose of the FAA and, 
therefore, was preempted.157  
III. A Critique of the Court’s Analysis 
After Concepcion, class waivers may be invalidated as 
unconscionable if they are in an agreement that does not have an 
arbitration clause, but they may not be invalidated under the same 
doctrine if they are in an agreement that does have an arbitration 
clause. In other words, by opting for arbitration, corporations can 
always opt out of class actions, despite a generally applicable state-
law doctrine that would limit such opt outs. This result is not 
consistent with the purpose of the FAA that is reflected in the text 
and legislative history: eliminating judicial hostility by ensuring that 
arbitration agreements are enforced on equal footing with other 
contracts. Had the Court premised its preemption analysis on the true 
congressional purpose, rather than a purpose driven by the judicially 
created policy of favoritism, the Court would not have expanded the 
preemptive effect of the FAA to a generally applicable state contract 
doctrine like the Discover Bank Rule.  
A. The Court Relied on an Incorrect “Overarching Purpose” 
Under obstacle preemption, state law is only preempted if it 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”158 Thus, Congress’s purpose 
is the “ultimate touchstone” in the preemption analysis.159 Moreover, 
the Court must presume that Congress did not intend to preempt 
state law absent a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”160 
Accordingly, if the purpose relied upon by the Court is incorrect, the 
preemption analysis is incorrect.161 
 
156. Id. at 1753. 
157. Id. 
158. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
159. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
160. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
161. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Obstacle preemption is 
controversial. Justice Thomas is one of its most vehement critics:  
[T]his brand of the Court’s pre-emption jurisprudence facilitates 
freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations of the 
“purposes and objectives” embodied within federal law. This, in 
turn, leads to decisions giving improperly broad pre-emptive 
effect to judicially manufactured policies, rather than to the 
statutory text enacted by Congress pursuant to the Constitution 
and the agency actions authorized thereby. Because such a 
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That is precisely the problem with the Court’s decision in 
Concepcion. The overarching purpose identified by the Court—to 
“ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their 
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings” (referred to 
hereafter as the streamlined proceedings purpose)—is flawed.162 First, 
the streamlined proceedings purpose ignores the equal footing policy 
reflected in the text of the FAA and expressed in the legislative 
history of the FAA. Second, the streamlined proceedings purpose 
places undue weight on the judicially created policy favoring arbitra-
tion. Third, the streamlined proceedings purpose incorporates a vision 
of arbitration that is not reflected in the FAA.  
1. The Court’s streamlined proceedings purpose discounts the equal 
footing policy reflected in the text of the FAA and expressed in the 
legislative history of the FAA. 
The Court’s analysis of the overarching purpose of the FAA gave 
little, if any, weight to the equal footing policy reflected in the text of 
the FAA and expressed in the legislative history of the FAA. This 
policy, however, is an indispensable part of the FAA’s purpose. As 
such, the Court should have given the equal footing policy significant 
weight in defining the overarching purpose of the FAA.163 
 
sweeping approach to pre-emption leads to the illegitimate—and 
thus, unconstitutional—invalidation of state laws, I can no 
longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts state laws merely 
because they “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives” of federal law, as 
perceived by this Court. 
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see 
also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 678 
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the concomitant danger of 
invoking obstacle pre-emption based on the arbitrary selection of one 
purpose to the exclusion of others”). Other Supreme Court Justices have 
also expressed concerns. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the obstacle 
preemption doctrine as “potentially boundless (and perhaps 
inadequately considered)” and noting that one commentator has 
criticized the doctrine and suggested that the Court eliminate it); 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388–91 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the majority’s use of legislative history 
to determine statutory intent where statutory intent is “perfectly 
obvious on the face of th[e] statute”). Commentators have similarly 
criticized obstacle preemption because the doctrine is susceptible to 
manipulation. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 
231 (2000) (arguing that “constitutional law has no place for the 
Court’s fuzzier notions of ‘obstacle’ preemption”).  
162. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added); see also supra note 
147 (discussing the Court’s test for preemption).  
163. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) 
(“To discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory 
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To determine Congress’s purpose for a preemption analysis, the 
Court must, of course, consider the text of the FAA.164 Congress did 
not include an explicit statement of purposes in the text of the FAA, 
but the Senate Report declared that “[t]he purpose of the [Act] is 
clearly set forth in section 2.”165 Section 2 provides that arbitration 
agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”166 Thus, the savings clause is part and parcel of the purpose 
of the FAA.  
 As discussed in Part II.A, the Court’s purpose analysis focused on 
the policy favoring arbitration and the presumed purpose of 
arbitration agreements. The Court did not, however, consider the 
effect of the savings clause on the purpose of the statute.167 Instead, 
before beginning its purpose analysis, the Court discounted the 
savings clause because it did not “suggest[ ] an intent to preserve 
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA’s objectives.”168 Thus, the Court reasoned that the savings clause 
could not be used to save a right that “would be absolutely 
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.”169 Based on these 
principles, the Court defined the FAA’s overarching purpose without 
considering the effect of the savings clause on that purpose. The 
conundrum here is that the Court identified an overarching purpose 
without considering the full text of section 2, specifically without 
considering the savings clause. Then, the Court refused to apply the 
savings clause because doing so would conflict with that statutory 
purpose. In effect, the Court wrote the savings clause out of the FAA 
for purposes of its preemption analysis.  
 
language and the structure and purpose of the statute.” (quoting 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990))). 
164. Id. 
165. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).  
166. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
167. The Court’s purpose analysis first focused on the FAA’s “principal 
purpose” of “ensur[ing] that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms” and noted that the purpose was “readily 
apparent from the FAA’s text,” pointing to section 2, as well as sections 
3 and 4. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to section 2, the Court 
noted the savings clause in passing, stating that section 2 “makes 
arbitration agreements ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ as written 
(subject, of course, to the savings clause).” Id.  
168. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
169. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 
228 (1998)).  
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In preemption cases in other contexts, the Court has recognized 
the import of a savings clause in identifying congressional purpose. In 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,170 the Court held that the 
existence of a savings clause required it to read an express preemption 
clause narrowly.171 Although section 2 of the FAA is not formulated 
as an express preemption clause, the substance is precisely that. As 
one commentator noted,  
for most purposes, [section 2] is identical to a provision that “no 
state or local government shall adopt or enforce any law or 
policy that makes a written arbitration agreement in a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce invalid, revocable, 
or unenforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”172  
Thus, the structure of section 2 may differ from a typical express 
preemption clause and savings clause combination, but the policy and 
the effect are the same. Under Geier, the enforcement portion of this 
recast provision would be narrowly construed as a classic express 
preemption clause coupled with a savings clause. There is no reason 
 
170. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
171. See id. at 867–68 (“Without the saving[s] clause, a broad reading of the 
express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt [state common-
law liability] actions.”). In Geier, federal law required airbags in certain 
vehicles. The defendant in a products liability case asserted that the 
plaintiff’s “no airbag” tort claim was preempted by the federal law. Id. 
at 866–67. The federal statute included an express preemption provision 
precluding states from establishing or continuing any “safety standard 
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of 
equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.” Id. at 867 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
The statute also had a savings clause providing that compliance with 
the federal standard did not “exempt any person from any liability 
under common law.” Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). The Court held that, in light of the 
savings clause, the preemption clause should be read narrowly to 
preclude only state statutes and regulations, and not common law 
claims. Id.  
172. Nelson, supra note 161, at 299 (asserting that the presumption against 
preemption is flawed and should be abandoned and that a general policy 
of obstacle preemption is misplaced). According to Nelson, the Court has 
taken the position that express preemption clauses should be read 
narrowly, at least in areas of traditional state regulation, which is 
consistent with the Court’s stated presumption against preemption. Id. at 
298. Nelson suggested, however, that the Court only applies the 
presumption halfheartedly and “does not insist that other express 
provisions of federal law should also be read narrowly in order to minimize 
what the Court calls ‘conflict’ preemption.” Id. Thus, the Court construes 
section 2 of the FAA as a substantive rule, rather than a preemption 
clause, and reads it broadly rather than narrowly. Id. at 299.  
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that the enforcement clause of section 2 should be construed broadly 
simply because it was cast as a substantive rule instead of an express 
preemption clause.173  
Even if the Court’s differing treatment of substantive rules and 
express preemption clauses is reasonable, the savings clause is still an 
indicator of congressional intent regarding the substantive rule. In 
Geier, the Court considered whether a state-law tort action was 
impliedly preempted by the federal law.174 Although the Court 
concluded that the state rule was preempted, the Court first 
considered whether the savings clause protected the state-law rule 
from implied preemption.175 The Court concluded that the savings 
clause was not broad enough to encompass the state-law rule.176 The 
Court reasoned that the specific language of the savings clause did 
not suggest an intent to save all state-law tort actions.177 Rather, the 
Court looked to the language of the savings clause and determined 
that it only spoke to a specific defense.178  
Unlike the narrow savings clause at issue in Geier, the savings 
clause in section 2 of the FAA explicitly saves all generally applicable 
state laws. Thus, the enforcement clause of section 2 is modified by 
the savings clause of section 2. Indeed, the Court acknowledged more 
than forty years ago that “the ‘saving[s] clause’ in § 2 indicates [that] 
the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements 
as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”179  
Thus, the Court should have analyzed how the savings clause 
affected the purpose of the statute. If the Court had given the savings 
clause due consideration, the analysis would have changed 
 
173. As Nelson explained, there is “no obvious reason” that statutory 
language that is, in substance, an express preemption clause should be 
construed more broadly than a provision explicitly cast as a preemption 
clause. Id. at 299. 
174. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. 
175 Id. at 869–70. 
176 Id. at 870. 
177. Id. at 869–70.  
178. Id. (concluding that the savings clause prohibited the defense that 
compliance with federal law exempted a defendant from state law).  
179. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967) (emphasis added) (“To immunize an arbitration agreement from 
judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to 
elevate it over other forms of contract—a situation inconsistent with the 
‘saving[s] clause.’”); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. 
Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009) (“[Section 2] creates substantive federal law 
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements, requiring courts 
‘to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.’” 
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989))). 
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significantly. The inclusion of the savings clause in section 2 reflects 
that Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was to ensure that 
arbitration agreements were on equal footing with other contracts by 
expressly providing for arbitration agreements to be subject to the 
same defenses as other contracts.180  
This equal footing purpose is further buttressed by the legislative 
history of the FAA.181 As detailed in Part I.A, the legislative history 
of the FAA reflects that Congress enacted the FAA in response to 
judicial hostility that resulted in decisions refusing to enforce 
agreements simply because they were arbitration agreements.182 To 
combat this judicial hostility, Congress enacted the FAA to ensure 
that arbitration agreements would be reviewed “upon the same 
footing as other contracts.”183 This conclusion about the purpose 
shown in the legislative history is not just the musing of 
commentators mining the legislative history; it is also identified in the 
Court’s cases. Almost four decades ago, the Court recognized that the 
legislative history established that the purpose of the FAA was to 
 
180. See O’Reilly, supra note 144, at 18 (“The savings clause increases the 
need for attention to the specific context, because the decision of 
Congress to include a savings clause means Congress did not desire to 
occupy the entire field.”). 
181. The Court has recognized the importance of legislative history in 
determining the statutory purpose for a preemption analysis. See, e.g., 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1983) (relying on legislative history to 
determine the extent to which statutory language was intended to affect 
the ability of states to regulate energy facilities); Ray v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 166–67 (1978) (relying on legislative history to 
support the conclusion that Congress intended to establish a uniform 
nationwide standard for tanker-design standards and, therefore, preempt 
state laws that varied from the federal standard). 
182. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1757 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the “well known” fact that “many courts 
expressed hostility to arbitration” before the FAA). 
183. Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 
506, 511 (1974)). Indeed, the Court has previously recognized this very 
purpose. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 
2776 (2010) (acknowledging that the FAA “places arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts” and that 
arbitration agreements must be enforced “according to their terms,” 
subject to generally applicable state contract doctrines); Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“To overcome 
judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. Section 2 embodies the 
national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on 
equal footing with all other contracts . . . .”).  
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ensure that arbitration agreements were on equal footing with other 
agreements.184 And the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this purpose.185  
Despite this history firmly establishing the equal footing purpose 
of the FAA, the Court’s analysis in Concepcion failed to give this 
purpose any weight.186 The Court did acknowledge the equal footing 
mandate early in its opinion.187 But when the Court turned to 
determining the purpose of the FAA—a cornerstone in its preemption 
analysis—the equal footing mandate was omitted from the analysis.188  
In light of the text of the FAA and the legislative history, the clear 
purpose of the FAA was to overcome judicial hostility by ensuring that 
arbitration agreements stand on the same footing as other contracts. 
That is, arbitration agreements should be enforced (or invalidated) on 
the same grounds as any other contract. This purpose was not 
incorporated in the Court’s analysis or in its ultimate conclusion that 
the purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements for the 
purpose of facilitating streamlined proceedings. The Court’s failure to 
incorporate this established purpose reflects a fundamental flaw in the 
Court’s overarching purpose.  
2. The Court’s streamlined proceedings purpose places undue weight 
on the judicially created policy favoring arbitration.  
The Court’s overarching purpose draws heavily on the federal 
policy favoring arbitration. As discussed in Part II.C, based upon this 
favoritism policy and the Court’s repeated affirmations of the policy, 
the Court concluded that the FAA was actually designed to promote 
 
184. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“The House Report accompanying the Act 
makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration agreement 
‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs’ . . . .” 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924))). 
185. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (stating 
that the purpose of the FAA was to eliminate judicial hostility and 
ensure equal footing for arbitration agreements as compared to other 
agreements); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 
219–20; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511) (acknowledging that the Act was 
“designed” to put an end to the judiciary’s unwillingness to enforce 
arbitration agreements and to ensure that arbitration agreements were 
on equal footing with other contracts); Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510–511 
(recognizing that the FAA “revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements” and “was designed to allow parties to avoid ‘the 
costliness and delays of litigation,’ and to place arbitration agreements 
‘upon the same footing as other contracts’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-
96, at 1–2 (1924))). 
186. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748–49. 
187. Id. at 1745. 
188. Id. at 1748–49. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act 
130 
arbitration. Based on this conclusion, the Court held that the purpose 
of the FAA was to enforce agreements “so as to facilitate” 
arbitration.189 As reflected in the Court’s analysis of class arbitration, 
the purpose of “facilitating” arbitration includes avoiding deterrents 
to arbitration.190  
The policy favoring arbitration, however, is a judicial fiction. The 
Court asserted two grounds for its conclusion that the FAA reflects a 
policy favoring—even promoting—arbitration. First, the Court cited 
to legislative history establishing that Congress was aware of the 
potential benefits of arbitration.191 Second, the Court stated that its 
“cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote 
arbitration.”192 Neither reason establishes a congressional policy 
favoring arbitration. 
The legislative history relied upon by the Court does not reflect 
that Congress intended to favor or promote arbitration when it 
enacted the FAA. The Court cites to the following excerpt from the 
House Report: “It is practically appropriate that the action should be 
taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the 
costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely 
eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are 
made valid and enforceable.”193 This excerpt cannot be viewed in a 
vacuum. Rather, it must be considered in light of the explicit 
language of section 2 and the legislative history as a whole.  
As detailed in Part I.A, the text of section 2 and the legislative 
history of the FAA establish that the purpose of the FAA was to 
reverse judicial hostility by ensuring that arbitration agreements 
would be enforced on equal footing with other contracts. Indeed, the 
House Report expressly identifies the goal as equal footing—not 
favoritism: “Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, 
and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live 
up to his agreement. . . . [Thus, a]n arbitration agreement is placed 
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”194  
Only after making declarations about ensuring equal footing, 
eliminating judicial hostility, and protecting the parties’ rights does 
the House Report reference the practical benefits of arbitration, as 
 
189. Id. at 1748. 
190. See id. at 1752 (discussing the deterrent effect of class arbitration as one 
reason that the Discover Bank Rule was inconsistent with the FAA). 
191. Id. at 1749. 
192. Id. 
193. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
194. Id. at 1. 
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cited to by the Court.195 Thus, the House Report cited by the Court 
reflects only that (1) Congress recognized that contracting parties 
entered into arbitration agreements to obtain the practical benefits of 
arbitration and (2) making those agreements enforceable to the same 
degree as other contracts was appropriate because there was no just 
reason for them to be less enforceable. The House Report does not 
support a conclusion that the FAA was intended to favor or promote 
arbitration or to elevate arbitration agreements by insulating them 
from generally applicable state law. Such a conclusion is at odds with 
the expressly stated congressional purpose of ensuring that courts 
enforce arbitration agreements to the same degree as any other 
contract would be enforced—no more and no less.  
Thus, the remaining support for the policy favoring arbitration is 
the Court’s assertion that its “cases place it beyond dispute that the 
FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”196 But the Court can only 
interpret congressional intent; it cannot create it.197 Thus, while the 
Court’s decisions make it beyond dispute that the Court has 
repeatedly stated that the FAA establishes a policy favoring arbitra-
tion, it is not beyond dispute that the FAA actually does so. If the 
Court’s prior decisions lack support, then they are wrongly decided, 
even if controlling.198  
 
195. Id. at 2. The Senate Report is similar. As set forth in Part II.A, the 
Senate Report quotes the full text of section 2, including the savings 
clause, as the purpose of the FAA. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
Only after explaining the state of the law making arbitration agreements 
“in large part ineffectual” does the Senate Report discuss “the great 
value of voluntary arbitrations [and] the practical justice” of enforcing 
arbitration agreements. Id. at 2–3.  
196. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. As discussed supra in Part I.B, this 
policy of promoting arbitration was first declared in dicta and without 
support in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 23–25 (1983). Since then, the policy has become a mainstay in 
the Court’s arbitration decisions.  
197. Some would argue that allowing courts to infer congressional intent 
from legislative history is a backdoor for allowing courts to create 
congressional intent. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative 
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 807, 812 
(1998) (arguing against the use of legislative history as a tool for courts 
and pointing out the “illegitimate uses of legislative history . . . [as] 
efforts to make a substantive change in the law by means other than 
changing the statutory language”). 
198. Basic principles of judicial review acknowledge this proposition given 
that the Court can and does overrule previous holdings when it decides 
that those holdings were incorrect. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (overruling Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), thirty-six years after it was handed down). 
Indeed, in Concepcion, four Justices joined in a dissent rejecting the 
proposition that “Congress’ primary objective was to guarantee . . . 
procedural advantages” of arbitration, although they did not go so far as 
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Here, the proposition that Congress intended to establish a policy 
favoring arbitration by enacting the FAA is not supported in the text 
of the statute or the legislative history. As discussed previously, both 
the text of the statute and the legislative history reflect Congress’s 
intent to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements to the same 
degree as other contracts and to eliminate judicial hostility toward 
arbitration agreements. The fact that the legislative history acknowl-
edged the benefits of arbitration does not transform those benefits 
into an objective or purpose of the legislation. Rather, the 
acknowledgement provides context for why Congress would seek to 
ensure that the agreements intended to obtain those benefits should 
be subject to the same state-law principles as every other contract.  
The overarching purpose of the FAA, as identified by the Court, 
placed significant weight on the policy favoring arbitration. Had the 
Court acknowledged that this policy was one of judicial making rather 
than congressional purpose, it could not have concluded that the 
overarching purpose of the FAA was to “ensure enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”199  
Further, even if the policy favoring or promoting arbitration were 
supported by the text and legislative history, that policy would be, at 
best, a secondary purpose of the FAA. The Court has even 
acknowledged that the policy favoring arbitration should take a 
backseat to the purpose of equal footing: 
We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the 
[FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims. The 
Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitration of all claims, 
but merely the enforcement . . . of privately negotiated 
arbitration agreements. The House Report accompanying the 
Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration 
agreement “upon the same footing as other contracts, where it 
belongs,” and to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate.200 
Indeed, within the last two years, the Court has explained that its 
policy favoring arbitration is “merely an acknowledgement of the 
FAA’s commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to 
 
to reject the policy favoring arbitration altogether. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
199. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added). 
200. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985) 
(citation omitted). The Court held that lower courts should compel 
arbitration of arbitrable claims even if that would result in piecemeal 
litigation, despite the fact that piecemeal litigation conflicted with the 
goal of encouraging “efficient and speedy dispute resolution.” Id. at 221. 
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enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon 
the same footing as other contracts.’”201  
As a secondary purpose, the policy favoring arbitration should 
yield to the equal footing purpose, especially where failure to do so 
would exempt the agreement from generally applicable state law.202 
By giving primacy to the policy favoring arbitration, the Court 
harmed the primary purpose. Under Concepcion, arbitration 
agreements have been exempted from a generally applicable state 
law.203 Thus, the purpose of ensuring that arbitration agreements are 
enforced on equal footing as other contracts—a purpose the Court has 
previously acknowledged204—has been thwarted.  
 
201. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 
(2010) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). The Court rejected the 
assertion that the policy favoring arbitration required arbitration of 
some disputes despite insufficient evidence of an agreement to arbitrate 
the particular dispute. Id.  
202. See Granite Rock Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2859–60 (“We have applied the 
presumption favoring arbitration . . . only where it reflects, and derives 
its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration . . . is what the 
parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was 
validly formed and . . . is legally enforceable and . . . encompass[es] the 
dispute.” (emphasis added)). 
203. The Court’s holding is actually even broader than this. As discussed 
above, the Discover Bank Rule applies to class waivers, not arbitration 
agreements. See supra notes 143. The only reason the Discover Bank 
Rule affected the arbitration agreement was because AT&T tied the fate 
of the arbitration provision to the fate of the class waiver by inserting a 
non-severability clause. See supra note 143. Thus, the Court’s 
preemption of the Discover Bank Rule actually means that a non-
arbitration provision contained in a contract with an arbitration 
agreement has been exempted from a generally applicable state law. 
Arguably, the Court’s decision does not even require that the class waiver 
be tied to the arbitration agreement in order to be exempt from the 
Discover Bank Rule. After all, if class action procedures are inconsistent 
with arbitration, as the Court concludes they are, the invalidation of a 
class waiver would require class arbitration if a defendant chose to 
proceed with the arbitration it was entitled to under the agreement. Thus, 
the applicable rule would still be preempted under Concepcion. 
204. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (“As we have 
explained, [the FAA’s] ‘purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common 
law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.’” (quoting Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991))); Dean 
Witter, 470 U.S. at 219–20 (rejecting the “suggestion that the overriding 
goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims” 
and concluding instead that the “House Report accompanying the 
[FAA] makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration 
agreement ‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs,’ 
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3. The Court’s streamlined proceedings purpose incorporates a vision 
of arbitration that is not reflected in the FAA. 
The Court concluded that the overarching purpose of the FAA 
was not just to enforce arbitration agreements in order to promote 
arbitration. Rather, the purpose, according to the Court, was to 
“enforce arbitration agreements . . . so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”205 In support of this purpose, the Court stated that “the 
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes 
is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of 
dispute” and pointed out that the legislative history does not 
contemplate the existence of class arbitration.206 The Court noted that 
streamlined proceedings were the “prime objective of an agreement to 
arbitrate.”207 And after explaining that class arbitration would be 
more formal, more costly, and more procedurally complicated than 
individual arbitration, the Court concluded that class arbitration was 
“not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA.”208  
Yet this vision of what arbitration entails under the FAA is not 
reflected in the text of the FAA. The FAA does not dictate specific 
procedures required or prohibited in arbitration.209 With the 
exceptions of section 5 and section 7, all of the provisions of the FAA 
focus on the time period before and after the arbitration.210 Section 5 
of the FAA provides a procedure for appointing an arbitrator if the 
agreement does not provide a method or if, for some reason, the 
method fails.211 Section 7 provides arbitrators with the authority to 
summon witnesses and documents and provides a mechanism for 
 
and to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate” (citation omitted)). 
205. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
206. Id. at 1749. 
207. Id. (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
208. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
209. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). Similarly, while the legislative history of 
the FAA reflects that Congress was aware that those entering into 
arbitration agreements did so, at least in part, because they desired 
streamlined, time-efficient, and cost-efficient proceedings, the legislative 
history does not support the conclusion that Congress envisioned any 
particular proceedings. 
210. See id. (including provisions dealing with jurisdiction, applicability, 
staying court proceedings, petitioning the district court to compel 
arbitration, giving notice, vacating and modifying awards, and appealing 
court orders regarding arbitration). 
211. Id. § 5.  
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enforcing the summons in a district court.212 The FAA does not, 
however, dictate other requirements for or prohibitions on the 
procedures to be followed.  
Indeed, the Court has previously held that “[t]here is no federal 
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.”213 
Rather, Congress intended for courts to enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate under any set of procedural rules the parties agreed to—
whether streamlined or extremely complicated—so long as those 
procedures do not run afoul of generally applicable state law.214  
To be sure, parties entering into an agreement to arbitrate may 
desire streamlined proceedings, as acknowledged in the legislative history 
of the FAA. But the intent of the contracting parties does not establish 
congressional purpose. Congress’s purpose was simply to ensure that 
arbitration agreements were on equal footing with other contracts. 
Moreover, the view of arbitration as streamlined, procedurally 
minimalistic, inexpensive, and quick does not match the reality of 
many modern arbitrations. Some forums permit depositions215 and 
broad discovery, including discovery of electronically stored infor-
mation.216 Some forums significantly curtail the possibility of early 
disposition.217 Indeed, while the Court relies on the proposition that 
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation,218 modern arbitration 
 
212. Id. § 7.  
213. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 476 (1989). 
214. Agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
215. See, e.g., JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures 
R. 16.2(d)–(e), 17(b) (JAMS, effective Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/JAMS-rules/JAMS 
_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2010.pdf (permitting depositions in 
arbitration proceedings); Commercial Arbitration Rules & Media-
tion Procedures R. L-4(d) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, amended and 
effective June 1, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/Show 
Property?nodeId=/UCM/adrstg_004103 (permitting depositions in 
arbitration proceedings for complex commercial disputes). 
216. See, e.g., JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures 
R. 16.2(f), 17 (JAMS, effective Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/JAMS-rules/JAMS 
_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2010.pdf (permitting broad discovery 
in arbitration proceedings, including e-discovery). 
217. See, e.g., Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes R. 12504 (FINRA, last amended June 6, 2011), http:// 
finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element
_id=7377 (severely limiting motions to dismiss prior to the arbitration 
hearing). 
218. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749, 1751.  
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guarantees no such benefits.219 It may be unlikely that Congress 
“envisioned” an arbitration procedure that looks so much like 
litigation, but such an arbitration procedure is the modern reality. 
Moreover, it is consistent with the FAA given that Congress did not 
mandate specific procedures. 
If the Court had acknowledged in Concepcion that the FAA does 
not establish a federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set 
of procedural rules, as it has previously acknowledged,220 it could not 
have concluded that the overarching purpose of the FAA included the 
concept of streamlined proceedings. Rather, the Court would have 
been compelled to recognize that Congress’s purpose in enacting the 
FAA was merely to eliminate judicial hostility by ensuring 
enforcement of arbitration agreements on the same footing as other 
contracts. 
 
219. See e.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, The War in the Workplace Must End, 
But Arbitration is Not the Answer, in Advanced Empl. L. & Litig. 
101, 105 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 1–3, 1994), available at C953 
ALI-ABA 101 (Westlaw) (“Increasingly, those who have had experiences 
with arbitration report that it is not cheap, not quick, and as 
acrimonious as a court battle.”); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, 
They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in 
Arbitration’s Image, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 579, 585–89 (2007) 
(reviewing data, statistics, and anecdotal reports and concluding that 
arbitration is not necessarily quicker or cheaper than litigation). But see 
L. Tyrone Holt, Whither Arbitration? What Can Be Done To Improve 
Arbitration and Keep Out Litigation’s Ill Effects, 7 DePaul Bus. & 
Com. L.J. 455, 456 (2009) (noting that while commentators as well as 
arbitration participants “perceive arbitration as becoming as costly and 
time-consuming as litigation,” the limited empirical evidence available 
suggests that arbitration may still be less expensive than litigation). In 
August 2003, the ABA Section of Litigation’s Task Force on ADR 
Effectiveness conducted a survey intended to ascertain “trial lawyer 
perceptions of the effectiveness of [arbitration].” ABA Section of 
Litigation Task Force on ADR Effectiveness, Survey on 
Arbitration 2 (2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/taskforces/adr/surveyreport.pdf. The survey produced mixed 
responses. While 78 percent of those responding found arbitration to be 
“generally timelier than litigation” and 56 percent found it to be 
cheaper, 60 percent reported that they recommended arbitration “less 
than 3 times out of 10” and 34 percent reported that they recommended 
against arbitration “6 times out of 10.” Id. at 4. Of those who counsel 
against arbitration, 22.2 percent cited excessive costs as a primary 
reason. Id. Even for those recommending arbitration, the report 
indicates that some of those recommendations may be based on the fact 
that arbitration is the only option (e.g., a statutory or contractual 
mandate compels it). Id. at 5. 
220. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration 
under a certain set of procedural rules . . . .”). 
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B. The Discover Bank Rule Does Not Stand as an Obstacle to the 
Purpose of the FAA 
The Court’s preemption analysis rises or falls on its identification 
of the overarching purpose of the FAA. Once that overarching 
purpose is revised, as it must be, it becomes evident that the Discover 
Bank Rule is not preempted.  
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”221 As discussed 
previously, Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was to overcome 
judicial hostility by ensuring that arbitration agreements stand on the 
same footing as other contracts. The Discover Bank Rule is a 
generally applicable state law. It does not target arbitration. Its im-
pact is not limited to arbitration agreements.222 And it does not 
“take[ ] its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate 
is at issue.”223 To the contrary, it applies to contracts with arbitration 
provisions and to contracts without arbitration provisions.224 
Thus, under the Court’s analysis, if the contract in Concepcion 
had not contained an arbitration agreement, the California Supreme 
Court would have been well within its rights to invalidate the class 
waiver under the Discover Bank Rule. But solely because the contract 
did include an arbitration agreement, the California Supreme Court 
was precluded from invalidating the class waiver under the Discover 
Bank Rule. This outcome immunizes a contract with an arbitration 
agreement from a generally applicable state law. As such, it imper-
missibly “elevate[s the arbitration contract] over other forms of 
contract.”225  
Although the Court previously recognized that elevating 
arbitration contracts over other forms of contract is inconsistent with 
 
221. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
222. The Court predicted that the Discover Bank Rule “would have a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.” Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1747. The Court’s assumption appears to be that entities which 
would be subject to class actions, and thus desire class waivers, would 
also desire arbitration. It seems illogical to allow the fact that arbi-
tration agreements have become almost omnipresent in certain contracts 
to convert an otherwise generally applicable state law into a law that 
targets arbitration.  
223. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (warning the lower court 
that it could not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a 
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable”). 
224. See supra notes 108, 109, 143 (discussing judicial application of the 
Discover Bank Rule). 
225. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967).  
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the FAA and the savings clause specifically,226 the Court abandoned 
that principle in Concepcion. In doing so, the Court thwarted the 
equal footing purpose of the FAA in favor of the Court’s own policy 
favoring arbitration. 
Conclusion 
The Court’s decision in Concepcion dealt a significant blow to the 
savings clause, thwarted the purpose of Congress in enacting the 
FAA, and further expanded the preemptive effect of the FAA. Over a 
decade ago, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the Court had long 
since “abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with 
respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its 
own creation.”227 With each decision emphasizing the Court’s policy 
favoring arbitration, the Court has reinforced this edifice and allowed 
a judicially created preference for arbitration to influence its decisions 
and thwart Congress’s purpose. 
In Concepcion, the Court used this edifice to justify a significant 
expansion of federal power under the FAA. Until Concepcion, the 
lower courts, and perhaps the legislators, have  
taken the Supreme Court at face value. [They] have taken it to 
mean what it says when it always points out . . . that those 
grounds that exist at law and equity for the revocation of any 
contract can be applied to binding, pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements.228 
With Concepcion, the Court has shown that it can no longer be taken 
at face value on this point. The Court is willing to curtail the savings 
clause and subvert Congress’s equal footing purpose in the interest of 
the Court’s policy favoring arbitration as a streamlined proceeding.229 
As a result, generally applicable state-law doctrines that should be 
protected by the savings clause are now at risk if they interfere with 
the Court’s newly established policy of promoting arbitration as a 
streamlined proceeding.230  
 
226. Id. 
227. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
228. Terry N. Trieweiler, in Pound Civil Justice Institute, The 
Privatization of Justice? Mandatory Arbitration and the 
State Courts: Report of the 2003 Forum for State Appellate 
Court Judges 38 (2006), available at http://www.roscoepound.org/ 
images/2003forumreport.pdf.  
229. See supra Part III. 
230. As one commentator has noted, although Concepcion focused on a 
specific application of the unconscionability doctrine, the case “leaves 
one wondering what is left of the doctrine of unconscionability in [the] 
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Of course, Congress could amend the FAA to rein in the Court’s 
expansion of federal power and to curtail the policy favoring 
arbitration. Indeed, over the last decade, members of Congress have 
introduced legislation seeking either wholesale amendments to the 
FAA231 or amendments carving out targeted industries like nursing 
homes and consumer debt collectors.232 Concepcion prompted renewed 
calls for significant changes to the FAA.233 To date, however, the calls 
for reform have not been heeded.  
 
arbitration setting.” Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration 
Trilogy: Revelation, Reaction and Reflection on the Direction of 
American Arbitration, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 21, 2011, 8:36 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/the-third-arbitration-trilogy-
revelation-reaction-and-reflection-on-the-direction-of-american-arbitration.  
231. E.g., Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, S. 1186, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Fair 
Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002). 
232. E.g., Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 
111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 2838, 
110th Cong. (2008); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008, 
H.R. 6126, 110th Cong. (2008); Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2008, H.R. 5312, 110th Cong. (2008). Although attempts to amend the 
FAA directly have been unsuccessful, indirect efforts to carve out a 
targeted industry have met with some success. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle 
Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
§ 11028, 116 Stat. 1835 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)) 
(providing that arbitration of a dispute arising out of a motor vehicle 
franchise contract is only available if all parties to the dispute consent 
to arbitration after the dispute arises). 
233. On the day the Concepcion decision was issued, Senator Al Franken, 
Senator Richard Blumenthal, and Representative Hank Johnson 
announced that they intended to reintroduce the Arbitration Fairness Act 
to “restore consumers’ rights to seek justice in the courts” by 
“eliminat[ing] forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, and 
civil rights cases.” Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, Sen. Richard 
Blumenthal & Rep. Hank Johnson, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. 
Hank Johnson Announce Legislation Giving Consumers More Power in 
the Courts Against Corps. (April 27, 2011), available at 
http://blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-franken-
blumenthal-rep-hank-johnson-announce-legislation-giving-consumers-more-
power-in-the-courts-against-corporations. Commenting on Concepcion, 
Senator Franken focused on the consequences of the decision to 
consumers: “This ruling is another example of the Supreme Court favoring 
corporations over consumers . . . . The Arbitration Fairness Act would 
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Although an examination of the existing legislative proposals is 
beyond the scope of this Article, any legislative reform should address 
the policy favoring arbitration. The Court’s decision in Concepcion 
makes it clear that this favoritism policy will not be abandoned or 
abated. Instead, the favoritism policy has become the foundation 
upon which the Court has expanded the preemptive effect of the 
FAA. The favoritism policy is at odds with the equal footing purpose 
of the FAA as reflected in the statute and expressed in the legislative 
history. Thus, any legislative reform should seek to eliminate 
ambiguity about the purpose of the FAA so that the Court will no 
longer have the freedom to find a policy favoring arbitration in the 
shadows of the FAA. Such a reform could be as simple as a statement 
of purposes expressing that the purpose of the FAA is to ensure that 
arbitration agreements are enforced and invalidated according to the 
same rules as are applicable to other agreements and clarifying that 
arbitration agreements are not only no less enforceable than other 
agreements but also no more. By reaffirming the statute’s historical 
purpose in explicit terms within the text, Congress could more 
effectively control the preemptive effect given to the FAA under the 
Court’s “potentially boundless” obstacle preemption doctrine.234  
 
help rectify the Court’s most recent wrong by restoring consumer rights.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
234. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
  
 
   
